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Let me begin with a few disclaimers: I am not an EU expert. I am not a British citizen nor do I fulfil 
any of the other criteria to be allowed to vote in the upcoming EU referendum. I am very pleased 
that I may express my opinion about the referendum in this alternative forum (an online blog) and 
thus get a voice in the referendum debate despite not having a voting right on 23rd June. 
This creates an interesting contrast to colleagues who do have a voting right in the referendum 
but use alternative forums to explain why they will not make use of this right. 
As my own “area of expertise” lies not with the dynamics and consequences of the EU but rather 
with issues of democracy and political violence, I would like to use the voice I was given to 
discuss five points that I regard as fundamental but underestimated aspects of the EU 
referendum debate in the UK. 
The first two points focus on the referendum as a political institution, the next two on the content 
of the referendum on 23rd June, and the last one is a brief speculation of what may happen if the 
Leavers win. 
Referendums can serve pro-democratic functions, by creating additional spaces 
of representation and accountability. This, however, does not mean that they are an intrinsically 
democratic institution, as they can and have been used for non-democratic purposes in a number 
of hybrid and autocratic regimes, including e.g. Venezuela and Egypt in recent years, and, a bit 
longer ago, Germany and Italy under fascist dictatorship. 
 
Even if they are performed under a liberal democratic framework, referendums do not 
necessarily enhance the legitimacy of political decisions or levels of vertical accountability in a 
political system either, as shown e.g. by on-going discussions about the ability of political elites 
and special interest groups to dominate referendum campaigns in Switzerland. Looking at the 
use of referendums under David Cameron’s prime ministership on AV (2011), Scotland (2014) 
and the EU (2016), their main intention was likely about bolstering the government’s power by 
ending inconvenient discussions rather than giving power to the people. 
Related to the previous point is the exclusionary nature of the referendum as a political 
institution. To be precise: Under a liberal democratic framework, referendums can make the 
political system more inclusive by creating additional opportunities for the electorate to express 
their interests freely and fairly. 
Yet referendums are still exclusionary in the sense that they are based on a zero-sum 
game whereby political gains are absolute and there is no compensation for the losers: On 23rd 
June, voters are asked to make a Yes-No choice and whatever the 50%+ majority of voters on 
that day decide will be the outcome of that referendum, while the interests of those who voted 
differently, who did not vote at all or who would have preferred a more nuanced choice will not be 
represented. 
The aforementioned two points underpin and exacerbate discussions about the actual content of 
the EU referendum on 23rd June. The first content-related point that I regard as fundamental but 
greatly underestimated are the normative roots of the EU, i.e. its origins as a reaction to the two 
World Wars, intended to avoid future violence and strengthen democracy in Europe. 
Of course this was not the only motivation for the founding of the EU and its predecessor 
organisations, nor are “peace” and “democracy” among the most frequently mentioned items that 
respondents in the UK associate with the EU. This latter point, however, becomes problematic, 
as voters on 23rd June should be aware that the normative element is an inevitable and 
inseparable part of the EU’s history. 
 
Hence, the choice on 23rd June is a normative one not just about current UK-EU relations but 
also about the EU as a project of peace and democracy (see also Jamie Pickering’s very 
insightful analysis of the peacebuilding ability and potential of the European Union). 
The preceding point becomes even more relevant in light of the recent strengthening of far right 
political parties in a number of European countries . In the UK, the debates leading up to the EU 
referendum seem to have contributed to and been shaped by this wave of far right sentiment, 
with which I specifically mean anti-immigration and defensive nationalist views. 
Whatever the outcome of the EU referendum on 23rd June, it will have shifted the balance of 
power between centre right and far right wingers in the UK in favour of the latter, hopefully only 
temporarily and hopefully not too considerably. But it will have shifted in one form or another: If 
the UK leaves the EU, this will have considerable implications for the already tense relationship 
between pro- and anti-EU forces within the Conservative party as well as between the 
Conservatives and UKIP. 
 
Even if the UK does not leave the EU, the debates surrounding the referendum have helped to 
make anti-immigration and defensive nationalist discourse more socially acceptable. This trend 
of normalising and thus giving strength to certain far right views is worrying news about British 
political culture. 
The final point is based on pure speculation, should the Leavers win on 23rd June. If they do and 
there is a chance of at least a short-term economic downturn after the Brexit , this can have 
serious implications for social stability in the UK: By now, it has become a truism in the academic 
literature that there is a correlation between poor economic performance (including economic 
deprivation and low economic growth rates) and the risk of political violence. 
Of course correlation is not the same as causation and political violence is a multi-faceted as well 
as multi-causal phenomenon that is influenced by more than just economic factors. A risk, 
however, remains a risk and thus worth bearing in mind. 
If you have the right to vote in the referendum on 23rd June, it will be down to you to decide what 
you will vote or whether you will vote at all. As it is your choice, I’ll refrain from concluding by 
recommending one choice or the other. If I may, however, I would advise only this: A voting right 
is a powerful tool. Think about it well and choose wisely. 
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